## Phase 1-3: Control Plane + Contract System - awooop_phase1_control_plane_2026-05-04.sql: 12 張核心表 + RLS - awooop_phase1_batch1_rls_2026-05-04.sql: 全部 FORCE RLS + GRANT - packages/awooop-contracts/: 六合約 JSON Schema + golden fixtures - src/models/awooop_contracts.py: Pydantic v2 contract models(extra=forbid) - src/repositories/contract_repository.py: contract lifecycle(draft→published→active) - src/services/contract_service.py: HMAC publish sig + Redis multi-sig activate - src/services/schema_validator.py: LLM output validator(retry×3, E-SCHEMA-001) ## Phase 2: Tenant Isolation - awooop_phase2_budget_ledger_2026-05-04.sql: budget_ledger + RLS - src/services/budget_service.py: Token Budget Hard Kill 三層防線 - src/core/context.py: PROJECT_ID ContextVar(31 background loop 自動繼承) - src/db/base.py + models.py: project_id 欄位 + RLS set_config 注入 - src/hermes/nl_gateway.py: project_id Redis key 前綴(Phase A 雙寫) - src/services/anomaly_counter.py: per-project 改造(Phase A fallback) ## Phase 4: Platform Shell in Shadow Mode - awooop_phase4_run_state_2026-05-04.sql: run_state + step_journal + idempotency - src/services/run_state_machine.py: 8-state FSM + SKIP LOCKED + stale reaper - src/services/platform_runtime.py: UUID v7 + W3C trace_id + shadow_execute - src/services/audit_sink.py: PII/secret redaction 9 patterns - src/api/v1/platform/runs.py: POST/GET /v1/platform/runs(Router→Service 架構) - src/workers/platform_worker.py: SKIP LOCKED worker + heartbeat + reaper loop - src/main.py: platform router + lifespan worker start/stop ## Phase 5: MCP Gateway 五閘門 - awooop_phase5_mcp_gateway_2026-05-04.sql: 4 表 + RLS - src/plugins/mcp/gateway.py: McpGateway(Gate 1~5, E-MCP-GATE-001~009) - src/plugins/mcp/redaction_middleware.py: 雙層 redaction + 16K 截斷 - src/plugins/mcp/registry.py: __provider name mangling(ADR-116) - src/plugins/mcp/credential_resolver.py: k8s secret ref 解析 - tests/test_mcp_credential_isolation.py: 10 個迴歸測試(secret leak 防再現) ## Phase 6-8: EwoooC + Channel Hub + Approval Token - awooop_phase6_ewoooc_onboarding_2026-05-04.sql: ewoooc tenant + 4 read-only MCP tools - awooop_phase7_channel_hub_2026-05-04.sql: conversation_event + outbound_message - src/services/provider_proxy.py: ProviderProxy + PlatformEnvelope(ADR-115) - src/services/channel_hub.py: Telegram inbound mirror + Progressive Feedback(30s) - src/services/awooop_approval_token.py: HS256 + jti NX replay 防護 + suggest mode Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
192 lines
7.2 KiB
Python
192 lines
7.2 KiB
Python
"""
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MCP Credential Isolation 迴歸測試
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==================================
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AwoooP Phase 5.5:防止 2026-04-18 Secret Leak 事故再現
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2026-05-04 ogt + Claude Sonnet 4.6
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覆蓋:
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1. credential_resolver 格式驗證(bad ref 拒絕)
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2. dev fallback 正確返回 (value, masked, sha256)
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3. secret value 不洩漏到 redaction_middleware output
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4. _mcp_audit key 在 redact_mcp_input 中被移除(不送 provider)
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5. AuditedMCPToolProvider.__provider 不可從外部直接存取(name mangling)
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import json
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import os
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import pytest
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class TestCredentialResolverFormat:
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"""credential_resolver 格式驗證"""
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def test_bad_ref_raises(self):
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"""格式錯誤的 ref 應拋出 CredentialResolutionError"""
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import asyncio
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, ".")
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from src.plugins.mcp.credential_resolver import (
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CredentialResolutionError,
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resolve_k8s_secret,
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)
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bad_refs = [
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"no-slash",
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"namespace/secret", # 缺 #key
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"NAMESPACE/secret#key", # namespace 大寫不符格式
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"ns/secret#", # key 為空
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"",
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]
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for ref in bad_refs:
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with pytest.raises(CredentialResolutionError):
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asyncio.run(resolve_k8s_secret(ref))
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def test_dev_fallback_resolves(self, monkeypatch):
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"""AWOOOP_DEV_SECRETS_JSON 設定後應正確解析"""
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import asyncio
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, ".")
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dev_secrets = {"awoooi/telegram-bot#TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN": "test-token-value-1234"}
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monkeypatch.setenv("AWOOOP_DEV_SECRETS_JSON", json.dumps(dev_secrets))
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from src.plugins.mcp.credential_resolver import resolve_k8s_secret
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value, masked, sha256 = asyncio.run(
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resolve_k8s_secret("awoooi/telegram-bot#TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN")
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)
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assert value == "test-token-value-1234"
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assert "test" in masked # 前 4 字元
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assert "***" in masked
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assert sha256 == hashlib.sha256("test-token-value-1234".encode()).hexdigest()
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def test_dev_fallback_missing_key_raises(self, monkeypatch):
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"""dev secrets 中找不到 key 應拋出錯誤"""
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import asyncio
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, ".")
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monkeypatch.setenv("AWOOOP_DEV_SECRETS_JSON", json.dumps({}))
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from src.plugins.mcp.credential_resolver import (
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CredentialResolutionError,
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resolve_k8s_secret,
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)
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with pytest.raises(CredentialResolutionError):
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asyncio.run(resolve_k8s_secret("awoooi/some-secret#key"))
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class TestRedactionMiddlewareSecretLeak:
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"""2026-04-18 Secret Leak 迴歸:secret value 不得進入 output"""
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def test_pg_dsn_redacted_from_output(self):
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"""PG DSN 在 output redaction 後不可見"""
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, ".")
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from src.plugins.mcp.redaction_middleware import redact_mcp_output
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output = {
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"connection": "postgresql+asyncpg://admin:supersecret@10.0.1.5/prod",
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"status": "connected",
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}
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cleaned = redact_mcp_output(output)
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assert "supersecret" not in json.dumps(cleaned), "PG DSN 密碼不得出現在 output"
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assert "[REDACTED:PG_DSN]" in cleaned["connection"]
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def test_telegram_token_redacted_from_output(self):
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"""Telegram token 在 output redaction 後不可見"""
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, ".")
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from src.plugins.mcp.redaction_middleware import redact_mcp_output
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output = "Bot token: 1234567890:ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPabcdefghijklmno12345678"
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cleaned = redact_mcp_output(output)
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assert "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO" not in cleaned, "Telegram token 不得出現在 output"
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assert "[REDACTED:TELEGRAM_TOKEN]" in cleaned
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def test_internal_ip_redacted(self):
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"""GCP 內網 IP 在 output redaction 後不可見"""
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, ".")
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from src.plugins.mcp.redaction_middleware import redact_mcp_output
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output = {"host": "10.0.1.5", "port": 5432}
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cleaned = redact_mcp_output(output)
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assert "10.0.1.5" not in json.dumps(cleaned), "內網 IP 不得出現在 output"
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assert "[REDACTED:INTERNAL_IP]" in cleaned["host"]
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def test_mcp_audit_key_removed_from_input(self):
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"""_mcp_audit key 在 redact_mcp_input 後應被移除"""
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, ".")
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from src.plugins.mcp.redaction_middleware import redact_mcp_input
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params = {
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"_mcp_audit": {"session_id": "abc123", "run_id": "xyz"},
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"namespace": "default",
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}
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cleaned = redact_mcp_input(params)
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assert "_mcp_audit" not in cleaned, "_mcp_audit 應在送 provider 前移除"
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assert cleaned["namespace"] == "default"
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def test_k8s_value_credential_isolation(self):
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"""k8s_value 欄位應被 credential isolation 攔截"""
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, ".")
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from src.plugins.mcp.redaction_middleware import redact_mcp_input
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params = {
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"k8s_value": "actual-secret-credential",
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"tool": "some-tool",
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}
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cleaned = redact_mcp_input(params)
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assert "actual-secret-credential" not in json.dumps(cleaned)
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assert cleaned["k8s_value"] == "[REDACTED:CREDENTIAL_ISOLATION]"
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class TestNameManglingEncapsulation:
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"""AuditedMCPToolProvider.__provider name mangling 封裝驗證"""
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def test_single_underscore_not_accessible(self):
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"""_provider(單底線)應不存在於 AuditedMCPToolProvider 實例"""
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, ".")
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from src.plugins.mcp.interfaces import MCPToolProvider, MCPTool, MCPToolResult
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from src.plugins.mcp.registry import AuditedMCPToolProvider
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class DummyProvider(MCPToolProvider):
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@property
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def name(self): return "dummy"
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async def list_tools(self): return []
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async def execute(self, tool_name, parameters):
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return MCPToolResult(success=True, execution_id="t")
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wrapped = AuditedMCPToolProvider(DummyProvider())
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assert not hasattr(wrapped, "_provider"), (
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"_provider 不應可直接存取(name mangling 防止直接存取 inner provider)"
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)
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def test_double_underscore_mangled(self):
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"""__provider 應被 Python name mangling 重命名"""
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, ".")
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from src.plugins.mcp.interfaces import MCPToolProvider, MCPTool, MCPToolResult
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from src.plugins.mcp.registry import AuditedMCPToolProvider
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class DummyProvider(MCPToolProvider):
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@property
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def name(self): return "dummy"
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async def list_tools(self): return []
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async def execute(self, tool_name, parameters):
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return MCPToolResult(success=True, execution_id="t")
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wrapped = AuditedMCPToolProvider(DummyProvider())
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# Python name mangling: __provider → _AuditedMCPToolProvider__provider
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assert hasattr(wrapped, "_AuditedMCPToolProvider__provider"), (
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"name mangling 後的屬性應可被內部存取"
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)
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assert wrapped.name == "dummy"
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