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awoooi/apps/api/migrations/adr090b_awoooi_migrator_role.sql
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feat(ops): ADR-090-B 零信任收尾範本 — wrapper / sudoers / migrator / CI
2026-04-18 台北時區 —— ogt + Claude Opus 4.7 (1M)

本 commit 響應本 Session 兩次憑證外洩事故
(feedback_secrets_leak_incidents_2026-04-18.md),
交付統帥可直接部署的零信任基礎設施範本.

檔案清單:

1. scripts/host-ops/awoooi-hosts-add.sh
   - 110 主機 /etc/hosts 白名單 wrapper
   - 只允許預定義主機名,idempotent,帶 IP 格式驗證
   - 安裝: /usr/local/bin/awoooi-hosts-add (root:root 0755)

2. scripts/host-ops/awoooi-wrapper.sudoers
   - 配套 sudoers 規則 (NOPASSWD for wrapper + SIGHUP only)
   - 安裝: /etc/sudoers.d/awoooi-wrapper (root:root 0440)
   - 禁 tee / bash / sh 這類 generic shell access

3. apps/api/migrations/adr090b_awoooi_migrator_role.sql
   - PG 限權角色 awoooi_migrator
   - 只能 DDL (CREATE/ALTER/DROP/INDEX/COMMENT)
   - 明確 REVOKE 所有 DML + default privileges 鎖死
   - 本檔由統帥執行 (需 superuser),不由 Claude 執行

4. k8s/awoooi-prod/awoooi-migrator-secret.template.yaml
   - K8s Secret patch 範本
   - 新增 MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL key (awoooi_migrator 連線串)
   - 與應用 DATABASE_URL 拆開

5. .gitea/workflows/run-migration.yml
   - CI 自動套用新 migration (單 transaction + ON_ERROR_STOP)
   - 用 Gitea secret MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL,不走明碼
   - 每次成功寫一筆 asset_discovery_run (audit trail)

零信任三層防線 (對應 feedback_secrets_leak_incidents):
  L1 對話無密碼 -> wrapper 內建白名單
  L2 操作經 wrapper -> sudoers + awoooi_migrator
  L3 顯示強制遮蔽 -> CI 走 secret,不走 env

本 Session 發現的 3 次憑證外洩全部在 feedback_secrets_leak
memory 登記,並有對應 P0 輪替計畫.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 13:23:39 +08:00

106 lines
4.6 KiB
SQL

-- ADR-090-B: awoooi_migrator 限權角色 + 憑證分離
-- 建立時間: 2026-04-18 台北時區
-- 建立者: ogt + Claude Opus 4.7 (1M)
--
-- 上游: ADR-090 主檔 + feedback_secrets_leak_incidents_2026-04-18
--
-- 目的:
-- 1. 把 migration 操作從「應用 superuser」(awoooi) 拆出,避免 CI / AI 腳本需要生產密碼
-- 2. awoooi_migrator 只能 CREATE / ALTER / DROP / INDEX / COMMENT,不能 SELECT / DML
-- 3. 若 migrator 帳號外洩,攻擊者也無法讀取資料,只能結構性破壞 (可 rollback)
--
-- 執行者: 統帥 (需 superuser 權限 postgres 執行) — Claude 只起草,不執行
--
-- 執行步驟 (請統帥在 188 主機上 psql as postgres 超級使用者):
-- 1. 以 postgres 連上 awoooi_prod
-- 2. 把下方 <RANDOM_STRONG_PASSWORD> 替換為您親自產生的密碼
-- 3. 執行本檔
-- 4. 更新 K8s secret awoooi-secrets 新增 MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL
-- 5. 測試: PGPASSWORD='<new>' psql -h 188 -U awoooi_migrator -d awoooi_prod
-- → 應可 CREATE TABLE x(); 但不能 SELECT * FROM incidents;
--
-- 回滾: DROP OWNED BY awoooi_migrator; DROP ROLE awoooi_migrator;
-- ============================================================================
-- Step 1: 建立 migrator 角色 (預設無密碼,立即設定)
-- ============================================================================
DO $$
BEGIN
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'awoooi_migrator') THEN
CREATE ROLE awoooi_migrator WITH LOGIN;
END IF;
END $$;
-- ★ 替換為您親自產生的 32+ 字元隨機密碼 (建議 openssl rand -base64 32) ★
ALTER ROLE awoooi_migrator WITH PASSWORD '<RANDOM_STRONG_PASSWORD>';
-- 註: ALTER ROLE 不會寫入 pg_stat_statements log (若有 log_statement=all 請先關掉)
-- ============================================================================
-- Step 2: 授予 DDL 權限 (CREATE / ALTER / DROP / INDEX / COMMENT)
-- ============================================================================
-- 允許連線 awoooi_prod
GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE awoooi_prod TO awoooi_migrator;
-- 允許在 public schema 建表 / 建 index
GRANT USAGE, CREATE ON SCHEMA public TO awoooi_migrator;
-- 允許管理所有現有表 (ALTER / DROP / INDEX / COMMENT)
-- 注意: 這不包含 SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE
GRANT REFERENCES, TRIGGER ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO awoooi_migrator;
-- 允許執行所有 funcs (ALTER FUNCTION / DROP FUNCTION 需要)
GRANT EXECUTE ON ALL FUNCTIONS IN SCHEMA public TO awoooi_migrator;
-- 未來新建物件自動繼承上述權限 (對 awoooi 這個 owner 建的物件)
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public
GRANT REFERENCES, TRIGGER ON TABLES TO awoooi_migrator;
-- 允許使用 pgcrypto / vector 等 extension
GRANT USAGE ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA public TO awoooi_migrator;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public
GRANT USAGE, SELECT, UPDATE ON SEQUENCES TO awoooi_migrator;
-- ============================================================================
-- Step 3: 明確撤銷 DML 權限 (雙重保險,即使以後有誤 grant 也攔得住)
-- ============================================================================
REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public FROM awoooi_migrator;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA public
REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TABLES FROM awoooi_migrator;
-- ============================================================================
-- Step 4: 驗收查詢 (執行後手動檢查)
-- ============================================================================
-- 4.1 角色存在?
-- SELECT rolname, rolsuper, rolcreatedb, rolcreaterole, rolcanlogin
-- FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'awoooi_migrator';
-- -- 預期: rolname=awoooi_migrator, rolcanlogin=t, rolsuper=f
-- 4.2 schema 權限?
-- SELECT has_schema_privilege('awoooi_migrator','public','CREATE');
-- -- 預期: t
-- 4.3 DML 權限應該沒有?
-- SET ROLE awoooi_migrator;
-- SELECT * FROM incidents LIMIT 1; -- 預期: ERROR permission denied
-- RESET ROLE;
-- 4.4 DDL 權限應該有?
-- SET ROLE awoooi_migrator;
-- CREATE TABLE test_migrator_check (id INT);
-- DROP TABLE test_migrator_check;
-- RESET ROLE;
-- -- 預期: 兩條都成功
-- ============================================================================
-- END OF MIGRATION adr090b_awoooi_migrator_role.sql
-- 安裝後 CI / AI 腳本憑證路徑:
-- 未來所有 migration 使用 MIGRATION_DATABASE_URL (awoooi_migrator)
-- 應用 pod 繼續用 DATABASE_URL (awoooi, 限 DML)
-- 兩條 URL 分別存 K8s secret 的不同 key
-- ============================================================================