feat(governance): 新增 Agent Telegram digest policy

apps/api/src/api/v1/agents.py

@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ from src.services.ai_agent_deployment_layout import (
 from src.services.ai_agent_proactive_operations_contract import (
     load_latest_ai_agent_proactive_operations_contract,
 )
+from src.services.ai_agent_telegram_action_required_digest_policy import (
+    load_latest_ai_agent_telegram_action_required_digest_policy,
+)
 from src.services.ai_agent_tool_adoption_approval_package import (
     load_latest_ai_agent_tool_adoption_approval_package,
 )
@@ -645,6 +648,35 @@ async def get_agent_tool_adoption_approval_package() -> dict[str, Any]:
         ) from exc
 
 
+@router.get(
+    "/agent-telegram-action-required-digest-policy",
+    response_model=dict[str, Any],
+    summary="取得 AI Agent Telegram action-required digest policy",
+    description=(
+        "讀取最新已提交的 AI Agent Telegram action-required digest policy；"
+        "此端點只回傳 critical / action-required / failure-only digest 規則與 redaction 邊界，"
+        "不送 Telegram、不寫 Telegram Gateway queue、不改 Alertmanager route / receiver、"
+        "不寫 AwoooP event、不觸發 workflow、不查外部掃描、不執行 runtime、不讀取 secret、"
+        "不回傳工作視窗對話內容。"
+    ),
+)
+async def get_agent_telegram_action_required_digest_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return the latest read-only AI Agent Telegram action-required digest policy."""
+    try:
+        return await asyncio.to_thread(load_latest_ai_agent_telegram_action_required_digest_policy)
+    except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
+            detail=str(exc),
+        ) from exc
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        logger.error("ai_agent_telegram_action_required_digest_policy_invalid", error=str(exc))
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            detail="AI Agent Telegram action-required digest policy 無效",
+        ) from exc
+
+
 @router.get(
     "/runtime-surface-inventory",
     response_model=dict[str, Any],

apps/api/src/services/ai_agent_telegram_action_required_digest_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+"""
+AI Agent Telegram action-required digest policy snapshot.
+
+Loads the latest committed, read-only policy for deciding which AI Agent,
+version, tool-adoption, scanner, and upgrade signals may become
+action-required Telegram digest candidates. This module never sends Telegram
+messages, writes Telegram Gateway queues, changes Alertmanager receivers,
+triggers workflows, reads secrets, or exposes work-window transcripts.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from src.services.snapshot_paths import default_evaluations_dir
+
+_DEFAULT_EVALUATIONS_DIR = default_evaluations_dir(Path(__file__))
+_SNAPSHOT_PATTERN = "ai_agent_telegram_action_required_digest_policy_*.json"
+_SCHEMA_VERSION = "ai_agent_telegram_action_required_digest_policy_v1"
+_RUNTIME_AUTHORITY = "policy_only_no_telegram_send_or_route_change"
+_TRANSCRIPT_MARKERS = {
+    "# In app browser",
+    "My request for Codex",
+    "Current URL:",
+    "AGENTS.md instructions",
+    "<environment_context>",
+    "批准！繼續",
+}
+
+
+def load_latest_ai_agent_telegram_action_required_digest_policy(
+    evaluations_dir: Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Load the newest committed AI Agent Telegram digest policy."""
+    directory = evaluations_dir or _DEFAULT_EVALUATIONS_DIR
+    candidates = sorted(directory.glob(_SNAPSHOT_PATTERN))
+    if not candidates:
+        raise FileNotFoundError(
+            f"no AI Agent Telegram action-required digest policy snapshots found in {directory}"
+        )
+
+    latest = candidates[-1]
+    with latest.open(encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        payload = json.load(handle)
+
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        raise ValueError(f"{latest}: expected JSON object")
+    _require_schema(payload, _SCHEMA_VERSION, str(latest))
+    _require_read_only_boundaries(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_rollup_consistency(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_success_noise_suppression(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_digest_gate_safety(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_message_redaction(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_no_plaintext_secret_payload_keys(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_no_conversation_transcript_content(payload, str(latest))
+    return payload
+
+
+def _require_schema(payload: dict[str, Any], expected: str, label: str) -> None:
+    actual = payload.get("schema_version")
+    if actual != expected:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: expected schema_version={expected}, got {actual!r}")
+
+
+def _require_read_only_boundaries(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    program_status = payload.get("program_status") or {}
+    if program_status.get("read_only_mode") is not True:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: program_status.read_only_mode must be true")
+    if program_status.get("runtime_authority") != _RUNTIME_AUTHORITY:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: runtime_authority must stay {_RUNTIME_AUTHORITY}")
+
+    operation_boundaries = payload.get("operation_boundaries") or {}
+    if operation_boundaries.get("read_only_policy_allowed") is not True:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: read_only_policy_allowed must be true")
+
+    blocked_operation_flags = {
+        "telegram_direct_send_allowed",
+        "telegram_test_message_allowed",
+        "telegram_gateway_queue_write_allowed",
+        "alertmanager_route_change_allowed",
+        "telegram_receiver_change_allowed",
+        "awooop_event_write_allowed",
+        "workflow_trigger_allowed",
+        "external_scan_allowed",
+        "runtime_execution_allowed",
+        "secret_plaintext_allowed",
+        "conversation_transcript_allowed",
+    }
+    allowed_operation_flags = sorted(
+        flag
+        for flag in blocked_operation_flags
+        if operation_boundaries.get(flag) is not False
+    )
+    if allowed_operation_flags:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"{label}: operation boundaries must remain false: {allowed_operation_flags}"
+        )
+
+    approval_boundaries = payload.get("approval_boundaries") or {}
+    allowed_approval_flags = sorted(
+        flag for flag, value in approval_boundaries.items() if value is not False
+    )
+    if allowed_approval_flags:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"{label}: approval boundaries must remain false: {allowed_approval_flags}"
+        )
+
+
+def _require_rollup_consistency(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    rules = payload.get("digest_rules") or []
+    channels = payload.get("digest_channels") or []
+    categories = payload.get("trigger_categories") or []
+    rollups = payload.get("rollups") or {}
+
+    expected_counts = {
+        "rule_count": len(rules),
+        "channel_count": len(channels),
+        "trigger_category_count": len(categories),
+    }
+    mismatched = {
+        key: {"expected": expected, "actual": rollups.get(key)}
+        for key, expected in expected_counts.items()
+        if rollups.get(key) != expected
+    }
+    if mismatched:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollup counts must match payload sections: {mismatched}")
+
+    by_decision: dict[str, int] = {}
+    for rule in rules:
+        decision = str(rule.get("decision"))
+        by_decision[decision] = by_decision.get(decision, 0) + 1
+    if rollups.get("by_decision") != by_decision:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.by_decision must match digest rule decisions")
+
+    expected_lists = {
+        "action_required_rule_ids": {
+            rule.get("rule_id")
+            for rule in rules
+            if rule.get("decision") == "draft_action_required_digest"
+        },
+        "failure_escalation_rule_ids": {
+            rule.get("rule_id")
+            for rule in rules
+            if rule.get("decision") == "draft_failure_escalation_digest"
+        },
+        "suppressed_success_rule_ids": {
+            rule.get("rule_id")
+            for rule in rules
+            if rule.get("decision") == "suppress_success_noise"
+        },
+    }
+    for key, expected in expected_lists.items():
+        if set(rollups.get(key) or []) != expected:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.{key} mismatch")
+
+    zero_rollups = {
+        "telegram_direct_send_allowed_count",
+        "telegram_gateway_queue_write_allowed_count",
+        "route_change_allowed_count",
+        "conversation_transcript_allowed_count",
+    }
+    nonzero = sorted(key for key in zero_rollups if rollups.get(key) != 0)
+    if nonzero:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: digest safety counters must remain 0: {nonzero}")
+
+
+def _require_success_noise_suppression(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    noisy_channels = [
+        channel.get("channel_id")
+        for channel in payload.get("digest_channels") or []
+        if channel.get("success_immediate_allowed") is not False
+        or channel.get("direct_send_allowed") is not False
+    ]
+    if noisy_channels:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: digest channels must suppress success/direct send: {noisy_channels}")
+
+    noisy_rules = [
+        rule.get("rule_id")
+        for rule in payload.get("digest_rules") or []
+        if rule.get("signal_state") in {"success", "verified"}
+        and rule.get("decision") != "suppress_success_noise"
+    ]
+    if noisy_rules:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: success/verified signals must suppress digest noise: {noisy_rules}")
+
+    summary_policy = str(payload.get("rate_limit_policy", {}).get("success_policy") or "")
+    if "成功" not in summary_policy or "不得" not in summary_policy or "Telegram" not in summary_policy:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rate_limit_policy.success_policy must block success spam")
+
+
+def _require_digest_gate_safety(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    unsafe_rules = [
+        rule.get("rule_id")
+        for rule in payload.get("digest_rules") or []
+        if rule.get("decision") in {
+            "draft_action_required_digest",
+            "draft_failure_escalation_digest",
+        }
+        and (
+            not rule.get("required_evidence")
+            or rule.get("telegram_direct_send_allowed") is not False
+            or rule.get("requires_openclaw_review") is not True
+        )
+    ]
+    if unsafe_rules:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: digest candidate rules need evidence and OpenClaw gate: {unsafe_rules}")
+
+    immediate_non_failure = [
+        rule.get("rule_id")
+        for rule in payload.get("digest_rules") or []
+        if rule.get("decision") == "draft_failure_escalation_digest"
+        and rule.get("signal_state") not in {"failed", "blocked", "critical"}
+    ]
+    if immediate_non_failure:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: failure escalation digest must stay failure-only: {immediate_non_failure}")
+
+
+def _require_message_redaction(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    template = payload.get("message_template_contract") or {}
+    required_fields = set(template.get("required_fields") or [])
+    required = {
+        "stage",
+        "severity",
+        "target_id",
+        "evidence_ref",
+        "blocked_reason",
+        "next_action",
+        "owner_agent",
+        "approval_gate",
+    }
+    if not required.issubset(required_fields):
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: message_template_contract.required_fields missing digest context")
+
+    forbidden_fields = set(template.get("forbidden_fields") or [])
+    required_forbidden = {
+        "secret_value",
+        "token",
+        "authorization_header",
+        "work_window_transcript",
+        "codex_user_message",
+        "prompt_text",
+        "chain_of_thought",
+        "session_id",
+        "browser_context",
+    }
+    if not required_forbidden.issubset(forbidden_fields):
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: message_template_contract.forbidden_fields missing redaction boundary")
+
+    display = payload.get("display_redaction_contract") or {}
+    if display.get("conversation_transcript_display_allowed") is not False:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: conversation transcript display must remain false")
+    if display.get("redaction_required") is not True:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: display redaction must be required")
+
+
+def _require_no_plaintext_secret_payload_keys(value: Any, label: str, path: str = "$") -> None:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        forbidden_key_fragments = {
+            "secret_value",
+            "token_plaintext",
+            "authorization_header",
+            "private_key",
+            "credential_value",
+        }
+        for key, nested in value.items():
+            normalized_key = str(key).lower()
+            if any(fragment in normalized_key for fragment in forbidden_key_fragments):
+                raise ValueError(f"{label}: forbidden plaintext secret key at {path}.{key}")
+            _require_no_plaintext_secret_payload_keys(nested, label, f"{path}.{key}")
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        for index, nested in enumerate(value):
+            _require_no_plaintext_secret_payload_keys(nested, label, f"{path}[{index}]")
+
+
+def _require_no_conversation_transcript_content(value: Any, label: str, path: str = "$") -> None:
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        for marker in _TRANSCRIPT_MARKERS:
+            if marker in value:
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"{label}: forbidden work-window conversation content at {path}: {marker}"
+                )
+    elif isinstance(value, dict):
+        for key, nested in value.items():
+            _require_no_conversation_transcript_content(nested, label, f"{path}.{key}")
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        for index, nested in enumerate(value):
+            _require_no_conversation_transcript_content(nested, label, f"{path}[{index}]")